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Abstract
Gaming regulators are uniquely positioned state agents, who must consider
contradictory goals in their day-to-day actions. They must protect the public (and
maintain the legitimacy of government) but are also responsible for ensuring that the
gaming industry provides needed revenue to the state. To that end, regulators are not only
responsible for promoting the legitimacy of the government but also, to some extent, must
consider how they can encourage the legitimization of a previously illegal behavior. Prior
research has examined regulators’ attempts to balance such “structural contradictions”
through their licensing process, but little research has been done on regulatory responses
to licensee violations. The present review suggests that a transparent and “responsive”
regulatory response to such violations would benefit regulators, the industry, and the
public. I review the contradictions inherent in regulating the gaming industry, describe
the “Responsive Regulation” approach, and then detail how “Responsive Regulation”
could uniquely benefit gaming. I conclude with a call for more collaboration between
regulators, practitioners (including industry participants), and academics.
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Introduction
Socio-legal scholars have long examined the government’s role in regulating
“vice” industries—those industries providing “taboo products” and services such as
alcohol, guns, and gambling (Matthews, 2016). By researching the legalization of vice
behaviors, we learn about the move from a relatively simple prohibitory approach
to a much more complicated regulatory process that must redefine the behavior and
draw new boundaries between what is legal and illegal (Cosgrave and Klassen, 2001;
Skolnick and Dombrink, 1978). Even as these behaviors become legal, a political
struggle remains in determining whether they are morally acceptable and how to
ameliorate potential harms (Spapens, 2012). Moral ambiguity, in turn, creates a problem
for state regulation of vice industries; newly legitimate businesses may not feel the need
to be regulated strictly, yet the industry needs regulation in order to enhance its social
reputation (especially when organized crime groups have been historically involved
in the industry; de Graaf et al., 2011; Mun, 2002; Skolnick, 1978). The United States’
federal and state governments have repeatedly modified their stance on behaviors to
reflect changes in social conscience, as with Prohibition, Jim Crow, abortion, and (more
recently) same-sex marriage and marijuana. An understudied aspect of these legalization
movements is the actual operation of government agencies and how these agencies
ensure both private and public interests are protected. Of particular import is how
states regulate vice behaviors, which pose potentially significant harm if not monitored
effectively.
Jurisdictional governments benefit from the revenue generated by gambling
(Williams et al., 2011; but see Walker and Jackson, 2011) and many generally feel that
having the freedom to gamble is a social benefit (Basham and Luik, 2011; Rockloff
et al., 2017), yet there is also much evidence that the citizens of those locations with
legalized gambling suffer a variety of social costs (Williams et al., 2011). Regulators are
responsible for prescribing and enforcing licensee efforts to protect consumers and the
public from harm and prevent crime in licensees’ venues. For example, the Pennsylvania
Gaming Control Board recently fined two casinos $15,000 total for issuing players’
cards and sending promotional materials to self-excluded gamblers—those individuals
who recognized that the lure of gambling was problematic for them and asked casinos to
a) make sure the casinos were not incentivizing their (the gamblers’) play and b) to take
steps to prevent the players from entering the casino premises (Pennsylvania Gaming
Control Board, 2013). Another example comes from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), who from January of 2015 – July of 2016 fined five different
casinos for failure to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act (Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, 2016). The SEC found that one of those casinos had been violating antimoney laundering statutes (e.g., by failing to have an internal compliance program or
internal compliance manager) since 2011.
Regulatory violations by gambling licensees can have severe consequences
for illegal behavior as well as addicted gamblers. Take the violations mentioned
above—by sending promotional materials to self-excluded gamblers, licensees were
ignoring the potential harm caused by problem gambling, which includes increased
suicidality, legal problems, bankruptcy, criminal behavior, and family problems (e.g.,
divorce, child maltreatment, and dysfunction; see Dannon et al., 2007; Delfabbro and
King, 2012; Gerstein et al., 1999; Séguin et al., 2010; Weinstein et al., 2015). As in the
second case, if licensees allow money laundering to occur, licensees may be implicitly
supporting drug trafficking, terrorism, and human trafficking by organized crime groups
internationally (Gilmore, 2004; Godinho, 2013; Levi, 2002). Other socially injurious
behaviors such as environmental degradation (e.g., To et al., 2011), encouraging risky
alcohol consumption (e.g., Hancock, 2011), or neglecting safety and health requirements
(e.g., Berman and Post, 2007; McGinley, 2012) clearly impact the communities in
which gambling licensees operate and the people who support licensee operations.
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However, this topic—why violations occur and how regulators can effectively respond
to them—remains understudied. Although much research has examined regulatory
strategies to control crime and prevent harm in the gambling industry, the literature
typically focuses on: how regulators use licensing requirements to prevent criminal
elements from entering the industry (see Homeyer, 2011; Sayre, 1994; Skolnick, 1978),
the need for policymaking to prevent harms (see Bogart, 2010; McGinley, 2012),
corporate social responsibility in the industry (see Buchanan et al., 2009; Gainsbury et
al., 2013; Hancock et al., 2008; Miers, 2016), or the legal liability that licensees should/
should not have for failing to prevent problem gamblers from accessing their venues
(Antolak-Saper, 2010; Bauer, 2006; Sasso and Kalajdzic, 2006; Slavina, 2010). What
tends to be ignored is the systematic study of regulatory responses to licensee violations
after noncompliance occurs. In other words, little empirical research has examined indepth regulatory responses to violations and how such responses are dictated by the
need for consumer protection, industry legitimacy, and government legitimacy at the
same time (but see Hancock, 2011 and Skolnick 1978).
This paper sets out to do two things. First, I use a criminological theory to
articulate the specific conflicts faced by gambling regulators as law enforcers and
architects of regulatory standards. Second, I focus on how those State agents can manage
inherent contradictions as they motivate compliance with regulations (which, in turn,
prevents harms such as crime victimization or problem gambling).1 I argue that agencies
can (and probably already do) handle the contradictions inherent in their jobs by using
a “Responsive Regulation” approach. Responsive Regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite,
1992), at its most fundamental level, recommends that regulators incorporate both
punitive and cooperative strategies when trying to motivate regulatory compliance.
Regulators need to clearly communicate what will happen when noncompliance occurs,
but cannot assume that a “one size fits all” response to noncompliance will work.
Focusing primarily on gambling regulation in the U.S. (but drawing heavily from the
international gambling literature), this paper argues that regulators should focus on: 1)
articulating clear standards for corporate social responsibility as well as communicating
and executing clear consequences for noncompliance with those standards, and 2) using
Responsive Regulation as a framework for responding to noncompliance.
In Section II, I briefly summarize regulators’ responsibilities before describing
Chambliss’s (1993) theory of Structural Contradictions and its relevance to the gambling
industry in Section III. In Section IV, I argue that regulators can handle structural
contradictions in the gambling industry by adopting a Responsive Regulation strategy
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite et al., 2007; Braithwaite, 2013) and outline
the benefits of clearly articulating such a regulatory approach. In Section V, I discuss the
need for more research collaboration between regulators, practitioners, and academics.
Responsibilities of Gambling Regulators
Understanding the conflicts involved in being a gambling regulator first
necessitates an understanding of the regulators’ responsibilities. Although gambling
regulators’ specific activities are numerous, they perform four basic functions: 1) policy
development/rulemaking; 2) licensing; 3) revenue collection; and 4) monitoring and
enforcement (Belletire, 1999; National Indian Gaming Commission, 2016a). I briefly
review these here:
1 A reviewer noted the lack of empirical evidence for this assumption that regulatory compliance
is related to harm minimization. My search of the gambling literature has failed to turn up any
research using data to directly link licensee compliance with harm outcomes, but evidence from
other domains supports such an assumption. See, as a few examples, Wakefield et al.’s (2000)
study on smoking laws; Mendeloff’s (1984) study of OSHA violations and workplace accidents;
and corporate noncompliance events linked to injuries/death in mining operations (Canada Department of Justice, 2002), automobile pollution (Barrett et al., 2015) and consumer products (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2015).
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•

Policy Development. Regulatory agencies generally are charged by legislators to formulate rules in a specific area; they are expected to develop special
knowledge about the topic and formulate rules accordingly. Such policies are
meant to protect the public and minimize the potential community harms that
come from legalized gambling (National Indian Gaming Commission, 2016b;
Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2016; New Jersey Casino Control Commission, 2016; Securities and Exchange Commission, n.d.).

•

Licensing. Many scholars argue that the most significant and distinguishing
feature of gambling regulation is the duty of regulators to control who enters
the industry. This is the way in which regulators establish legitimacy of the
industry—by preventing known criminals from employment in the industry
and being able to withdraw the licenses of noncompliant entities (Homeyer,
2011; National Indian Gaming Commission, 2016b; Nevada Gaming Control
Board, 2016; New Jersey Casino Control Commission, 2016; Securities and
Exchange Commission, n.d.).

•

Revenue Collection. In many jurisdictions, gambling regulators are responsible for defining the financial obligations of licensees, collecting revenues and
ensuring that licensees are paying the correct amount of taxes and fees. They
also decide how revenues will be distributed and used by the State. They will
sometimes work with state/jurisdictional Treasury Departments to accomplish
this, but are often responsible for auditing (or bringing in outside auditors) and
monitoring financial statements (Gale, 1994; National Indian Gaming Commission, 2016b; Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2016; New Jersey Casino
Control Commission, 2016; Securities and Exchange Commission, n.d.).

•

Monitoring and Enforcement. Of most import to this paper, regulators are
charged with protecting the public by ensuring that licensees comply with
the rules and regulations set forth by the agency. They conduct inspections
of gambling venues, respond to complaints by patrons or competitors, and
investigate potential violations of rules. They often handle violations through
administrative and/or civil courts and can sanction offenders using injunction
orders, monetary penalties, license suspension or revocation, etc. In particularly egregious cases, regulators will work with state attorney generals (or the
relevant legal authorities in the jurisdiction) to pursue criminal prosecution
of a licensee, often in conjunction with civil cases. Criminal prosecutions allow the regulators to have individual licensees arrested and subject to formal
criminal justice sanctions such as incarceration, probation, and punitive fines
(Friedman, 1994; National Indian Gaming Commission, 2016b; Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2016; New Jersey Casino Control Commission, 2016; Securities and Exchange Commission, n.d.).

The monitoring and enforcement component of gambling regulation is
relatively understudied. There is much literature on policy development, the licensing
process, and revenue collection. However, scholars have neglected to study how
regulators respond to licensee violations in a way that protects citizens and prevents
future noncompliance (while also protecting the legitimacy of the industry). A
criminological perspective is useful for understanding the importance of regulatory
actions in balancing the contradictory needs of the industry, public, and the State.
Structural Contradictions in the Gambling Industry
The legalization of vice is often motivated by the State’s need to generate
revenue, which can produce conflict between the State’s duty to protect its populace
and its desire to retain funding for programs (Cosgrave and Klassen, 2001; Skolnick,
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1979; Walker and Calcagno, 2013). Structural contradictions theory (Chambliss, 1993)
is a useful framework for understanding the struggle between maintaining long-term
economic interests of the State while maintaining legitimacy and protecting those in
lower socioeconomic classes. Chambliss argues that laws/policies are generally created
to resolve conflicts between society’s elites and the working class; such conflicts are
inherent in a capitalist society because of fundamental contradictions. The struggle
for profits by the working and ruling classes are oppositional—as the working class
struggles to make a profit, the interests of the ruling class are hurt (and vice versa). Such
a contradiction would lead to conflict if not mediated by the State. As in other structural
Marxist theories, Chambliss notes that the ruling economic class has a strong influence
on government policies and is often able to deflect attention from their members’
malfeasance while criminalizing the behavior of workers. Chambliss’s perspective
differs from traditional Marxist theories, though, as he recognizes the need of the State
to be independent from the power elite—if the government was purely an instrument
of the powerful, the working class would eventually revolt and social order would be
severely compromised. As such, the government must (at times) enact policies to benefit
the working class—this is why there are occupational health and safety laws, consumer
protection laws, securities regulations, and other policies that are detrimental to business
interests. However, even when laws are passed to protect the lower class, the economic
elite and the government must ensure that revenues continue to be generated and used
for the sustenance of society (Haines, 2016; Rodriguez and Barlow, 1999).
In the gambling industry, an inherent conflict exists whereby consumers
are possibly harmed by industry efforts to enhance profits, while the industry might
be harmed by burdensome consumer protections. It is up to gambling regulators to
strike a balance—to protect consumers (and maintain their own legitimacy) while also
protecting the industry (and benefit from revenue generation). In order to generate
revenue, the industry is also in need of the State to enhance its social reputation
(Cosgrave and Klassen, 2001; Humphreys, 2010; Panasitti and Schull, 1994; Skolnick,
1978). In other words, it’s not just a matter of legalization but also a need for
legitimation, or “the social process of making a practice or an organization congruent
with the configuration of other values, institutions, and social norms.” (Humphreys,
2010:491; see also Cosgrave and Klassen, 2001) Today, gambling is legal in some form
in most U.S. states. As of 2013, 28 states had casino gambling (American Gaming
Association, 2013) and in 2016, 48 states allowed gambling through lotteries, casinos,
Native American casinos, or pari-mutuel betting (Dadayen, 2016). Internationally, 153
countries have casino gambling, for a total of 7,243 casinos available worldwide. One
directory lists 3,755 online gambling sites and 10,463 online slots globally.2 As Banks
(2017: 2) describes:
“Dwarfing the revenues of other forms of entertainment such as
music, movies, and theme parks, legal gambling is a hugely profitable and
powerful industry of aleatory consumption. Gambling is highly lucrative, with
estimated global gaming revenues reaching US$423 billion in 2014 (Morgan
Stanley, 2015). Land-based casinos, which constitute the 12th largest industry
in the world, accounted for 35 per cent (US$146 billion) of global gaming
revenues, lotteries contributed 29 per cent (US$121 billion), whilst ‘other
gambling’, such as sports betting and pari-mutuel racing, and online gambling
represented 28 per cent (US$118 billion) and 9 per cent (US$37 billion),
respectively. Today, few regions of the world remain untouched by the onset of
global gambling.”
2 These international casino and online gambling data come from Casino City’s directory of
casinos and online gambling sites (http://www.casinocity.com). Although using numbers from a
sponsored page is not ideal, I was not able to find a comprehensive count of casinos and gambling
sites anywhere else.
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On the one hand, the legalization of gambling provides governments with
revenues that allow them to keep taxes relatively low and enable them to fund social
programs which otherwise would be unaffordable. For local communities, the presence of
a casino provides employment and increased tourism, while online gambling companies
also provide jobs. Yet, much concern remains about public participation in games of
chance. Gambling has been associated with increases in street crime, occupational crimes,
political corruption, individual bankruptcies, as well as mental and familial dysfunctions
resulting from problem gambling (Bogart, 2011; Cosgrove and Klassen, 2001; de Graaf
et al., 2011; Kingma, 2008; Walker and Calcagno, 2013), albeit inconsistently (see, e.g.,
Chang, 1996; Moufakkir, 2005; Nichols et al., 2004; Park and Stokowski, 2011).
In the gambling industry, State intervention is important to legitimation; the
public is not likely to trust businesses unless the government can ensure that harm
is minimized (Gainsbury and Wood, 2011). At the same time, too much government
intervention creates burdensome requirements that might hinder profit maximization and
decrease the competitiveness of licensees (Cabot, 1994). The question becomes one of
how regulators in the gambling industry are able to resolve conflicts arising from such
contradictory outcomes – how they are able to balance industry interests with public
safety and other government mandates. I discuss these divergent regulatory objectives in
more detail below.
The State’s responsibility to prevent harm to the public
Such regulatory role conflicts are not unique to gambling–similar issues emerge
in alcohol prohibitions (see Stockwell et al., 1997), tobacco laws (see Cohen et al., 1999;
Haile, 2009), pornography (see Cronin and Davenport, 2001), and recent marijuana
legalization efforts (see Caulkins et al., 2015). The unique aspect of gambling is that the
primary purpose of regulation is not to prevent physical injury to consumers, but rather
financial harm and collateral consequences to the community (Cabot, 1994; Gainsbury
et al., 2014). The impetus for strong regulation is thus weaker, therefore regulatory
approaches may be more easily influenced by societal and political whims (compared to
alcohol, tobacco, or marijuana).
Of course, the potential harm to the public should not be minimized. One
possible consequence, problem gambling, poses unique challenges to regulators, at
least partially because gambling addiction is subtler than other addictions. There are no
physiological symptoms of problem gambling (versus drunkenness or being high), there
are no discrete definitions of how much gambling is “excessive”, and a certain amount of
gambling that is recreational for one individual might be problematic for another person
depending on the income and available leisure time for each individual (Gainsbury et
al., 2014). Thus, “[a] dilemma for policymakers is that the characteristics of gambling
that lead some players into serious harm can be much the same characteristics that make
[gambling] fun for recreational gamblers … Therefore, policies must consider the most
appropriate and effective interventions that balance the needs of individuals (recreational
vs. problem gamblers) and society.” (Gainsbury et al., 2014: 773-774)
Regulators can address this balance between growth/potential harm by
mandating and promoting responsible business practices. In doing so, they improve
customer experiences, which then helps the industry grow (Gainsbury et al., 2013;
Gainsbury and Wood, 2011). As stated by Gainsbury et al., “The implementation and
maintenance of fair and responsible practices, appropriate regulation and codes of
conduct is in accordance with a profitable business model as it increases customer
acquisition and retention.” (Gainsbury et al., 2013: 235) Of course, this produces another
contradiction whereby more legalization of gambling increases participation in gambling
(Jacques et al., 2000; Pearce et al., 2008), as government approval and monitoring
communicates to the public that the behavior is safe (Gainsbury and Wood, 2011). With
this comes the potential for an increased prevalence of problem gambling (see Volberg,
1994). Regulators can resolve this contradiction by funding problem gambling programs
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with revenue received by the industry (Gainsbury and Wood, 2011).
In the increasingly prolific online gambling industry, Gainsbury and Wood
(2011) note that without regulation, Internet gamblers are being exposed to harm.
These individuals are going to gamble despite prohibition, and without government
monitoring, will do so on sites that are more likely to cheat or otherwise victimize them
(see also Gainsbury et al., 2014). A prime example of such issues can be found in the
Daily Fantasy Sports (DFS) industry. As of the time of this writing, DFS websites are
illegal in several U.S. states (but are legalized and regulated in other countries) due to
hazy classifications about whether such sites constitute gambling or not. As such, DFS
operators are not required to follow consumer protection guidelines (Pickering et al.,
2016). Without such protections or monitoring, the distribution of winnings are biased
towards DFS participants who put tremendous amounts of effort into tracking statistics
to “buy” the best players possible within a salary cap—in other words, casual players are
inherently disadvantaged (Irwin, 2015) despite the advertising of such websites as “easy
to play and easy to win” (Scott, 2017: 621). Due to the large amounts of money involved
in DFS wagers and the frequency/repetitiveness of betting opportunities, participation in
these leagues is thought to promote problem or pathological gambling behaviors (LopezGonzalez et al., 2017; Pickering et al., 2016; Scott, 2017). Furthermore, without strong
regulations to guide operators’ internal compliance programs, unethical behaviors by
employees are more likely to occur (e.g., the use of inside information by employees to
win on other sites; Pickering et al., 2016; Scott, 2017).3
Similarly, Scott and Barr (2013) describe unregulated gambling in Gauteng,
South Africa—specifically, the playing of dice, cards, and Fahfee (an illegal lottery).
Gamblers there are incredibly vulnerable to exploitation; Fahfee participants do not
know how the winning lottery number is picked, though there is evidence that the
lottery operator picks the winning number based on the distribution of bets (i.e., it is not
randomly chosen). “Runners” for the Fahfee lotteries have been victims of muggings.
In dice games, players acknowledge that it is easy for game operators to fix the game
in some way—to avoid this, players go to the same location to play where they can
recognize the other players. Law enforcement officers in the area are bribed so the games
can be played without many consequences.
Players in South Africa have mixed feelings about regulation. They recognize
some of the deleterious consequences of gambling, but see the games as an important part
of community life and feel that they actually do earn money from these games (reportedly,
the winners will give other losing players some money from what they earned). They
worry that legalization would increase the cost of participating in Fahfee if the operator
had to pay taxes. Interestingly, the players of these illegal games perceive gambling at
the legal local casino and through the legal state lottery as “rigged” or less fair than their
illegal games, despite efforts to educate them about how the lottery numbers are drawn
or suggestions that the casino could post the odds of winning. Scott and Barr (2013)
argue that a strong educational program about gambling and risk assessment would be
helpful, but that increasing law enforcement efforts would not be helpful—people gamble
there despite knowing that it is illegal. It seems logical that, given the ineffectiveness of
prohibition, legalization and monitoring would better allow the government to protect
consumers. Clearly, monitoring and enforcement is an area where regulators must balance
consumer safety concerns with industry growth.
The State’s need to generate revenue
Although gambling has been legal in Nevada since March 19th, 1931 – and
has spread throughout the United States since – the spread has not been consistent.
Prohibitions and restraints on gambling have come and gone since 1931. Research
demonstrates that legalization of gambling corresponds to government spending needs
3 Scott (2017:603 - 650) discusses possible regulations that would improve player protections as
well as protect sports leagues from corruption.
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– when “exogenous shocks” occur (e.g., the Great Depression, wars) that require
revenue, gambling legalization is more likely (Sauer, 2001; see also Dadayen, 2016).
Most recently, many U.S. states expanded access to gambling after the Great Recession.
Dadayen (2016) shows that gambling revenue going to state and local governments
increased by $500 million from 2008 – 2015. Schwartz (2016) also shows a national
increase in commercial gambling revenues over time ($28.4 billion in 2001 compared to
$39.5 billion in 2015).
Many scholars note that the gambling industry benefits from regulation. In a
vice industry where the consumer could possibly be harmed by the product, regulatory
oversight promotes the legitimacy of the industry and makes consumers feel protected
(Gainsbury et al., 2013; Loh et al., 2015). Thus, with legitimacy comes increased
consumption as well as more financing opportunities. In Nevada in the 1960s, the
casinos were able to get financing from legitimate banks/lenders after strong regulations
were put in place, and thus were able to distance themselves from criminal enterprises.
This ability to receive legitimate financing was further enhanced with Nevada’s
Corporate Gaming Act of 1969. After this law passed, gambling became more integrated
into the legitimate economy of that state (Panasitti and Schull, 1994). This happens
generally in vice industries—with legalization and regulation, consumers are able to
receive products/services from legal entities, rendering criminal enterprises unnecessary
(and their presence diminished). Regulators set minimum product/service quality
requirements to ensure safety, and transparency/monitoring of the market increases with
assurances that potentially harmful consequences of legalization will be addressed by
the State (Spapens et al., 2015).
However, too much regulation increases the cost of regulatory compliance for
licensees. This increases the cost of gambling, which then reduces demand for gambling
and revenue from gambling. Although regulation is needed to enhance and protect the
industry’s legitimacy, regulators should not create too much of a burden that reduces
competition within the industry (and has the potential to push consumers to illegal
gambling venues)—otherwise the State fails to benefit from legalization (Cabot, 1994;
Planzer and Wardle, 2012; see also Haines, 2016). As Adams et al. (2009: 698) put it
“… departments are often faced with the dual tasks of processing the financial benefit
from gambling along with containing the harm… strongly enforced regulations would
risk decreases in consumption and associated decreases in revenue, but the absence of
any attempt to reduce harm would risk public approbation for failing in a duty to protect
the weak and vulnerable.”
Regulators have responded to this dilemma by working with the industry to
develop regulations that are not overly burdensome, yet accomplish important public
protections. For example, the United Kingdom’s Home Office review of gambling
regulations in 2000/2001 sought to make regulations more cohesive and also create
regulations for Internet gambling. After this review, the regulators emphasized a
tolerance for competitive practices (including decreasing regulatory burdens on
gambling licensees) but also noted the need to consider possible consequences to
society and local communities that might accompany the rise of betting venues (Miers,
2011). Furthermore, the Britain Gambling Commission explicitly discusses the need
to balance regulatory burden and consumer protection with player agency and choice
to pursue gambling as a recreational activity. They attempt to resolve this tension
by emphasizing licensee conduct (e.g., the provision of gambling and compliance
information to consumers) as a “social responsibility” of operators and by stressing
the benefits of compliance to the operators themselves. The industry outwardly has
accepted regulation as a method of alleviating public concern with gambling, which in
turn benefits operators with increased consumption (Miers, 2016). This seems like a
fruitful mechanism for regulatory agencies to pursue in their responses to violations—
and one that could be incorporated into a broadly responsive, strengths-based
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regulatory approach. In the next section, I recommend Responsive Regulation as method
for responding to violations by licensees in such a way that considers all stakeholder
interests.
A Proposed Solution: Responding Responsively to Gambling Licensee
Noncompliance
I suggest here that the best method by which regulators can effectively promote
casino compliance while legitimizing the industry is by 1) clearly defining rules and
sanctions to be used if noncompliance occurs and 2) responding to noncompliance
consistently using “Responsive Regulation” as their strategic framework.
Benefits of a Transparent, Clearly Articulated Regulatory Approach
Even without a “responsive” component, regulators would benefit from clearly
articulating what will happen when licensees violate regulations. As Belletire (1999:2)
stated:
“The ability of staff, boards and commissions, and the courts to articulate their
reasoning and relate that reasoning to…policy and purpose, helps to assure
consistency and avoid arbitrariness in the regulatory process.”
In other words, regulators should make their strategies explicit and public,
clearly communicate what behaviors are acceptable and unacceptable, the behaviors
that will be punished, and specific punishments to be expected when violations occur.
A primary function of law is to communicate to all citizens what will be tolerated and
what will not (Huang and Wu, 1994; Tyler and Darley, 1999)—this is no different in
the regulatory domain. With clear prohibitions and a clear sanctioning strategy, the
relationship between regulators and the regulated entity will be enhanced—the regulated
community will be assured that violators are punished in a consistent manner and will
know what to expect when they are found to be in violation. There has been much
support for Procedural Justice Theory in the criminal justice literature—this theory says
that individuals are more likely to see an authority as legitimate when they treat each
alleged offender fairly and consistently with others, even if a punitive sanction is meted
out (Rorie et al., in press; Tyler, 2006). By clearly articulating a sanctioning approach,
violators will know that they are being treated in accord with agency policy, without bias.
Transparency will also reduce the likelihood of “regulatory capture” accusations (Wexler,
2011).4
A highly public sanctioning strategy may not only improve relationships between
the regulators and the regulated, but can produce compliance by licensees through two
mechanisms. First, many gambling corporations are motivated to comply for reputational
reasons (Planzer and Wardle, 2012). Thus, with more transparency of the sanctioning
process (including publication of who is being sanctioned), one would presume that those
corporations being punished would increasingly be subject to informal social controls.
This is beneficial for the industry as a whole, not just individual violators—regulations
affect all potential violators and a clear strategy can impact the norms and behaviors of
the entire industry (Gainsbury et al., 2015; Hess, 2008; Netherlands Gaming Authority,
2016a). In fact, large Nevada casinos often monitor smaller casinos to prevent violations
because they know that wrongdoing by one or a few parties might have implications (e.g.,
increased regulations, impaired reputation) for the entire industry (Buchanan et al., 2009).
4 Regulatory capture refers to the idea that public sector employees come to serve the private
entities they are supposed to monitor and no longer act on behalf of the public. In the regulatory
domain, regulators might come to sympathize with those entities’ interests and, as a result, create
lenient policies, water down or repeal existing policies, become lax in monitoring the industry, and/
or sanction the regulated community lightly. With clear and public sanctioning, the public is better
able to monitor regulators and ensure the agency is following its directives (Ayres and Braithwaite,
1991; Etzioni, 2009; Lodge, 2004; Wexler, 2001).
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Second, increased transparency could produce compliance through increased
awareness/education of consumers about the agencies involved in preventing and/or
sanctioning corporate crime. Thus, consumers might be more willing to report concerns/
offenses, which enhances monitoring of corporations (see Rebovich et al., 2000; Titus
and Gover, 2001; Van Wyk and Mason, 2001). An example of such a strategy is the
Netherlands Gaming Authority’s (2016b) use of social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter,
LinkedIn) to inform consumers about their rights and responsibilities, provide any
gambling-related warnings relevant to consumers, and receive consumer complaints.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, transparency can also help reduce regulatory
agency burden. Gainsbury et al. (2013) note that consumer disputes in the Internet
gambling domain may be driven by the lack of regulatory transparency in that domain; if
consumers knew exactly what constituted a crime or an issue worthy of disputation, they
may be more likely to report truly harmful behaviors and less likely to escalate minor
and lawful disagreements.
Clearly articulated policy will also be beneficial since transparency in one
jurisdiction can lead to adoption of the strategy in other jurisdictions. In fact, it would
be advantageous to see international collaboration in the development of an enforcement
strategy, especially with the advent of Internet gambling and with increasingly
multinational casino corporations. Given that it is an international enterprise, industry
participants should work with governments to design and enforce social responsibility
mandates. As Gainsbury et al. note, “The benefits of aligning regulation between
jurisdictions include the promotion of international consumer protection standards and
sharing resources such as research on best practice and the development of effective
responsible gambling resources… harm minimization policies should be implemented as
enforceable regulations, as opposed to voluntary codes of conduct. This is important to
convey the responsibility of both governments and industry to ensure that consumers are
adequately protected.” (Gainsbury et al., 2014: 783)
Responsive Regulation: The Fundamentals
Responsive Regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002;
Braithwaite, 2011) is the most appropriate tactic for handling conflicts between various
interest groups and supporting responsible industry growth. The Responsive Regulation
approach stems from a desire to reconcile “laissez-faire” interests with those arguing
for stronger government interventions.5 There are three main components to Responsive
Regulation that are most important for gambling regulators to consider: the Enforcement
Pyramid, Tripartism, and the need for a strengths-based approach.
The Enforcement Pyramid. Responsive Regulation bridges deregulation and
pro-regulation camps by recommending that regulators, when responding to violations,
think not just about choosing a “command-and-control” strategy (characterized by the
use of punitive sanctions and adversarial relationships between state actors and those
in the industry) or a cooperative/persuasive approach (e.g., instead of fines or criminal
cases, educating corporations and providing assistance in developing internal compliance
programs). Instead, Responsive Regulation recommends the use of an “enforcement
pyramid” in which initial offending by a licensee elicits regulatory attempts to educate
and instill a normative desire to comply. This initial “cooperation/education” is beneficial
for many reasons. Regulators benefit because companies are more knowledgeable
5 A reviewer commented on the similarities between “Responsive Regulation” and “risk-based
regulation.” The two approaches are fundamentally different (though there is some overlap). Riskbased regulation prescribes how regulators should be targeting enforcement resources on certain
entities (i.e., the allocation of limited resources). Responsive Regulation prescribes a flexible
enforcement response that matches the motivations/capacity of entities in hopes of improving the
regulatory relationship and increasing compliance. For a good overview of how two concepts differ as well as how they complement one another, see Black and Baldwin (2010).
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than regulators about how best to improve internal corporate policies and procedures
so compliance is achieved more easily. A cooperative approach also motivates selfdisclosure from companies (thereby improving the likelihood of regulators learning of
noncompliance) and noncompliant parties are less likely to resist regulatory interference
administered in this way. However, should noncompliance continue, regulators would
escalate to increasingly punitive sanctions.6
Figure 1 demonstrates what an enforcement pyramid might look like for gaming
regulators.
License
Revoked
Criminal
Prosecution/
Penalties
License Suspended
Major Fine Assessed
Formal Complaint Filed with Minor
Fine
Formal/Public Warning Letter
Informal Sanctions (Letter of Concern,
Consultation and Training)

Figure 1. Example Enforcement Pyramid for Gaming Regulators
By allowing for both cooperation and punitiveness, Responsive Regulation
allows regulators to maintain long-term interests of capitalism (by allowing licensees
to operate fairly unencumbered as long as compliance is evident), but also protects
the citizenry (by implementing sanctions when harm or repeated violations threaten
consumer health). Regulators can also reduce adversarial encounters or relationships
with the regulated community (which can enhance compliance efforts; Braithwaite,
2002, 2011; Sherman, 1993; Tyler, 2006), but companies cannot expect to offend and
get away with it. Monitoring can be targeted at those licensees who have a history of
offending, or continue to offend, while trusting the remainder of the industry to selfregulate their behavior (e.g., through the creation of effective internal compliance
programs subject to regulatory approval and monitoring; Cabot and Preber, 2008).
It’s important to note that regulators must commit to escalating sanctions and the
application of significant penalties when noncompliance occurs—without a credible
threat of sanctions, cooperation is less likely during initial regulatory responses (Ayres
and Braithwaite, 1992).

6 A reviewer asked whether the pyramidal structure of the theory is more fluid than depicted here,
due to mitigating circumstances, degrees of severity, and situational circumstances involved for
each offense (see also Baldwin and Black, 2008, Mascini and Wijk, 2009). Braithwaite (2006:
887) specifies that the regulatory pyramid and escalation of sanctions should be used in all situations such that “…however serious the lawbreaking, our normal response is to try to have a
dialogue first for dealing with it, to only override this presumption is there are compelling reasons
for doing so.” Thus, regardless of the circumstances, regulators should always engage in dialogue
before escalating to sanctions, and should de-escalate once the regulated entity demonstrates a
commitment to compliance. In doing so, regulators develop more trust and legitimacy among the
regulated, which make sanctions more credible and compliance more likely.
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Tripartism. Another primary component of Responsive Regulation is the idea of
“Tripartism” or third-party inclusion – this means that the public, non-governmental
organizations, and other relevant stakeholders should be involved in monitoring both
the company as well as the regulatory agency to ensure that compliance is complete,
that regulatory capture is not occurring, and to promote those firms exhibiting prosocial behavior (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1991, 1992). In their “empowerment theory
of republican tripartism,” Ayres and Braithwaite (1991:435) argue that giving public
interest groups a place at the regulatory table reduces the likelihood that the industry
has too much power over regulators or over other groups—and vice-versa. When
the public is invited to participate in regulation (and regulators make efforts to be
transparent and provide information to relevant parties), citizens are likely to cooperate
and help develop regulations/strategies to promote compliance. When all parties
(regulators, industry, and public interest groups) cooperate, they all have an opportunity
to voice concerns and guide policymaking efforts—they can create solutions that are
more likely to be adopted by the licensees, more likely to be acceptable to the public,
and more likely to be enforced by front-line regulatory agents.
Taking a Strengths-Based Approach. A recent addition to the Responsive
Regulation paradigm is the concept of a “strengths-based pyramid” to be used
alongside the enforcement pyramid. As opposed to punishments, research demonstrates
that compliance is predicted by “efficacy-building strategies,” such as praise by
regulatory agents, trust building, reintegrative shaming, and skill-building for managers
and supervisors (Braithwaite et al., 2007:305). In their book Regulating Aged Care,
Braithwaite et al. (2007:318) promote the use of a “dual pyramids” strategy in which
regulators escalate up a pyramid focused on “pick[ing] strengths and expanding them”
prior to escalating punishments for noncompliance (via the traditional enforcement
pyramid; see also Braithwaite, 2011). With a strengths-based approach, regulators
move beyond simply fixing problems and instead reward companies who innovate,
problem solve, and continue to improve over time. Such companies often go beyond
regulatory requirements (see Berger-Walliser and Shrivastava, 2014; Kolieb, 2015). In
the gambling industry, rewards might take the form of (starting from the bottom of the
pyramid and escalating rewards) informal praise for innovations and improvements,
official and public praise for expanding on those strengths, and access to grant money
for continued capacity building. For example, a casino implementing a problemgambling program could be praised by the regulator during regular inspections.
Should the casino expand the program and demonstrate its effectiveness, the regulator
could provide the licensee with some form of public recognition such as a letter of
commendation on its website. The regulator (should progress continue) could then
work with the licensee to find grant money to further expand the program, perhaps
to other branches. Finally, the regulator could have some formal recognition or
certification of “best practice” adoption (see Ivec and Braithwaite, 2015 for analogous
suggestions in the health care domain). Figure 2 provides an example of what a
“strengths-based” pyramid might look like for gambling regulators.
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Formal "Best
Practices"
Certification
Collaborative
Effort to Expand
Program
Formal/Public
Commendation Letter
Informal Praise
(Internal Memorandums, Verbal Praise
from Inspectors)
Education/Persuasion to Adopt Strength

Figure 2. Example “Strengths-Based” Pyramid for Gambling Regulators
Benefits of Responsive Regulation for the Gambling Industry
The primary benefit of adopting the Responsive approach for gaming regulators
is its unique ability to resolve the conflicting objectives of their jobs, described above.
However, Responsive Regulation is also notable for its flexibility and for its effectiveness
in securing compliance efficiently. These benefits are discussed in turn here.
Reconciling structural contradictions. Responsive Regulation’s core
strength lies in its ability to reconcile the interests of various parties and, as such, will
help regulatory agencies manage competing/conflicting considerations inherent in vice
industries (i.e., the structural contradictions discussed above). Furthermore, its hybrid
approach (blending self-regulation with government intervention) overcomes inherent
weaknesses of some forms of regulation with the strengths of others. The evidence-based
strategies promoted in the original 1992 formulation, and the revisions to the approach
since then (e.g., integrating ideas of “networked governance”, “restorative justice”,
and the strengths-based pyramid) provide a reasonable system by which regulators can
protect the public from unfettered capitalism, but also protect the industry from an overly
assertive government.
However, for it to be effective, various stakeholders (e.g., gambling regulators,
licensees, consumer protection groups, community groups, financial institutions)
should be involved in the regulatory process to ensure that power is balanced and that
cooperation does not lead to a negative form of regulatory capture (Grabosky, 1997,
2013; Rorie, 2015; Wright and Head, 2009).7 With its explicit recommendation to include
non-governmental and non-industry stakeholders in regulatory efforts, this approach will
also produce more community support for what regulators do. Third party involvement
will enhance transparency as well as legitimacy of the agency and the industry.
General, but also situational. A key part of a Responsive Regulation strategy
is its emphasis on the general as well as the specific—i.e., it prescribes general industry
norms, makes specific recommendations for regulators, and also considers individual
actors’ motivations in its prescriptions. I am guided by Baldwin and Black (2008:69),
who argue:
7 Not all regulatory capture is bad – when the industry and the public are equally influential on the
regulatory agency, the regulator can use the industry’s information to better monitor and learn about
compliance issues while also engaging with the public to learn about/address their concerns (see
Bertels et al., 2014; Reiss, 2012; Thaw, 2014).
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“In a really responsive regulatory regime, responsiveness means responding
to the operating and cognitive framework of the particular firm or, put in other
terms, its own ‘attitudinal setting’. This goes beyond the question of how the
firm, or different individuals within the firm, interact on a personal level and
whether relationships are cooperative or antagonistic, to look at the broader
context that shapes the firm’s response to the regulatory regime.”
Although I agree with Baldwin and Black’s emphasis on understanding
each firm’s unique motivations, it would be impossible for an agency in charge of
many licensees to articulate regulatory philosophy on a case-by-case basis—such an
endeavor would be burdensome for already-strained agencies and would set regulators
up for claims of inconsistent treatment or bias. I argue that Responsive Regulation
offers higher-level propositions which serve as a starting point for regulatory agencies,
corporate compliance officers, law enforcement, and policymakers to consider when
motivating compliance. The strategy essentially prescribes a consistent but flexible
approach to enforcement.
In suggesting general strategies yet also thinking about individual regulatory
encounters, Responsive Regulation allows for discretion but concomitantly promotes
fairness in treatment (Braithwaite, 2002, 2011; Parker and Nielsen, 2011; Parker,
2013). By specifically taking a Responsive Regulation approach, regulators are able to
use common criteria for sanctioning criminal offenders—e.g., prior record and offense
severity. They are also able to adjust this sanctioning strategy for different situational
circumstances as well as over time as needed (Braithwaite, 2002, 2011; see also
Kingma, 2008:455), such as when public opinion of the gambling industry changes or
the nature of the industry itself changes (see Gainsbury et al., 2013; Loh et al., 2015).
Thus, regulators can be lenient when honest mistakes occur, but can be tough when
licensees cause social harm on a repeated basis (which likely happens already, but
should be explicitly stated to avoid perceptions/claims of unfair enforcement).
In an industry as complex, inter-jurisdictional, and as ever-changing as
gambling, regulators must have discretion and flexibility in how they approach each
situation and each firm, as well as how they adapt to changes over time (Gainsbury
et al., 2013; Gainsbury et al., 2014; Wright and Head, 2009). Responsive Regulation
has been shown to be an effective approach in a variety of settings and countries, plus
adaptable to unique industry characteristics (Ivec and Braithwaite, 2015; Rorie, 2015).
Responsive Regulation is therefore ideal for regulating vice behaviors because of the
need to be flexible when unanticipated events or changes in political and cultural norms
occur (Loh et al., 2015; Spapens et al., 2015).
More effective. With self-regulation as the norm and cooperation as the initial
response to noncompliance, regulators maintain a cooperative (but not weak8) stance
with relatively minor/infrequent offending. With this, governance is more cost-effective
and also more effective in terms of compliance outcomes—when licensees are not
putting up defenses against regulators, they will be more likely to provide information,
make voluntary disclosures, and be more open to problem-solving and educative
approaches (see Baldwin and Black, 2008; Braithwaite, 2002, 2011; Kolieb, 2015).
When offending does occur, Responsive Regulation can better help restore violators
and help them recover their legitimacy; regulators would not have to be purely
punitive, but could also be restorative in their sanctioning mechanism (Bertels et al.,
2014).
Something that has not been discussed much with regard to gambling, but
which could be especially useful for this “pariah” industry, is the applicability of the
8 See Hancock (2011), who compellingly argues that the “light touch” version of Responsive
Regulation is ineffective for the gambling industry.
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“strengths-based” approach put forth by Braithwaite et al. (2007). Responsive Regulation
increasingly encourages regulators to focus on the strengths of the regulated community.
In doing so, regulators can better encourage/assist with beyond-compliance behaviors and
corporate social responsibility efforts. Such efforts will not only prevent offending and
encourage better industry-government relations, but will further legitimize the industry
(Braithwaite, 2002, 2011; Braithwaite et al., 2007).
Criticisms of Responsive Regulation
Of course, no regulatory strategy is without criticism. Responsive Regulation
has been critiqued with regard to: regulatory capture concerns, whether it can be applied
in certain industries/settings, whether violators receive consistent/fair treatment, and the
ability of front-line regulators to escalate/de-escalate sanctions.
Regulatory capture concerns. A common criticism of Responsive Regulation
is the possibility of regulatory capture. By encouraging a cooperative relationship,
people fear that regulatory agents and the industry will come to exchange favors in
such a way that compliance is undermined (Rorie, 2015). For example, in return for
a gambling regulator endorsing lenient responses to offending, a gambling CEO may
promise that regulator a lucrative position in her firm upon the regulator’s departure from
the agency. Perhaps less drastically, other scholars argue that without adversarialism,
licensees have no incentive to comply more than superficially (Adams et al., 2009). The
Responsive Regulation approach, however, should not be seen as purely cooperative and
as promoting a relationship only between the regulators and the regulated entities. As
mentioned above, cooperation only occurs initially – when the enforcement pyramid is
the formal sanctioning strategy, licensees should be aware that punitive sanctions will be
used if noncompliance is detected.
Regarding employment of strengths-based regulatory approaches, the regulator
certainly risks looking like an industry promoter when rewarding “socially responsible
behaviors”—but that’s an inherent risk in all that they do. As stated above, the State needs
the regulator to legitimize the industry in order to benefit from it. By making rewards for
beyond-compliance behavior transparent to the public and other licensees, regulators will
be able to effectively promote corporations who are making efforts to protect consumers
and communities without compromising their ability to sanction noncompliance when
it occurs. Furthermore, Responsive Regulation calls for third party inclusion to ensure
monitoring of the regulator/regulatee relationship.
Not appropriate for large markets. Responsive Regulation has also been
criticized as not being appropriate for all settings. Some scholars suggest that the strategy
assumes a regulatory situation in which regulators and the regulated have repeated
face-to-face interactions between one or a few agents and the same people within the
business (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Etienne, 2013; Ford, 2013). In particularly large
gambling markets (e.g., Nevada) in which regulators cannot possibly monitor each
licensee proactively, it is unlikely that the same regulatory agent will be able to interact
with the same compliance managers frequently. Such inconsistency is likely to produce
uncertainty and, as such, a cooperative relationship (in which the regulated trusts the
regulator not to impose harsh sanctions in the face of initial noncompliance) is unlikely to
emerge (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Bisschop, 2014; Etienne, 2013; Ford, 2013; Heimer,
2011; Smith, 2011). It’s important to note that such a criticism is not really a failure of
the strategy; it is more of a shortcoming of current regulatory environments. Braithwaite
makes a strong argument that effective regulation must involve communication and
direct, regular contact between agents and the regulated community they oversee
(Braithwaite, 2002, 2011; Braithwaite and Hong 2015). In support of this, Rorie et al.
(in press) demonstrated that legitimacy and procedural justice considerations motivate
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compliance and overcompliance only in such direct interactions. Even in large gambling
markets, efforts should be made to increase the contact between the regulator and
the regulated. One possibility is to have compliance officers within casinos (those
employees responsible for monitoring internal compliance program implementation;
Cabot and Preber, 2008) act as “regulatory ambassadors” who check in regularly with
regulators (Braithwaite, 2013; Braithwaite and Hong, 2015).9
Inconsistent treatment of violators
Responsive Regulation’s enforcement pyramid garners criticisms in and of
itself. For one, scholars note that it allows for similar behaviors to be handled very
differently. A clear prescription of law is that enforcement efforts should employ similar
sanctions when responding to similar violations (Parker, 2013; Westerman, 2013).
Responsive Regulation argues, instead, that enforcement agents should look at the
offenders’ motivations and willingness to work with regulators and make changes to
come into compliance. Braithwaite (2013) argues that, although strategies to prevent
an arbitrary use of power are needed, regulators should be allowed to treat offenders
differently as long as there are clearly articulated reasons for doing so. If third-party
groups were involved in the process and monitoring the regulators, potentially dissimilar
responses to similar offenses could be transparently evaluated (Parker, 2013).
Restricted ability to escalate. Finally, regulators are often constrained in
how they respond to violations and therefore may not be able to escalate or deescalate
sanctions freely up and down the enforcement pyramid (Rorie, 2015). For one, when
a particularly harmful or serious violation occurs, regulators may face public pressure
to respond harshly (i.e., at the peak of the enforcement pyramid), even if it is the first
offense by a licensee (but see Footnote 6). Furthermore, regulatory resource constraints
or jurisdictional/relational issues with law enforcement agencies may prevent the
escalation of sanctions (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Bisschop, 2014; Rorie and van
Wingerde, 2017). Of particular import in the gambling industry, using the enforcement
pyramid may be particularly difficult for transnational corporations given the variations
in laws and available sanctions from one jurisdiction to the next (Rawlings, 2007). That
said, research about applying Responsive Regulation on an international scale abounds.
Abbott and Snidal’s (2013) recommendations, as one such effort, can inform attempts to
implement Responsive Regulation in this increasingly globalized industry.
How has Responsive Regulation been used in the Gambling Industry?
There is little information about whether Responsive Regulation has been
applied broadly in the gambling industry. Miers describes the British Gambling
Commission’s attempts to engage in “better regulation” in the early 2000s – a
description that included seemingly responsive behaviors (e.g., providing advice and
guidance to most of the regulated community, giving more discretion to regulators;
Miers, 2011). In Ivec and Braithwaite’s (2015) survey of Responsive Regulation
programs worldwide, they found that New Zealand’s Department of Internal Affairs
(which is responsible for regulating gambling in that country) uses a Responsive
Regulation strategy. A post to the World Online Gambling Law Report describes the
Malta Gaming Authority’s proposed “overhaul”, including its intentions to create a

9 A reviewer noted that regulatory agents may see such interactions with the industry as problematic, as they might produce public perceptions of “regulatory capture” and, as such, actually
reduce the legitimacy of the agency. This is why public interest groups also need to be involved. In
including citizens as well as industry players in regulatory functions, potential claims of “industry
capture” are minimized, trust can be built between the industry and the public as well as between
the regulators and the public, and the regulators are better able to communicate with licensees
about what is expected of them from their local stakeholders (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1991; Rorie,
2015).
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“single responsive regulatory framework.” (Jongmans, 2015) The Netherlands Gaming
Authority explicitly adopted a responsive approach recently, but has not yet fully
implemented it.10 Beyond these isolated descriptions, though, it appears that the vast
majority of gambling regulators do not formally identify themselves as “responsive.”
Recently, I started collecting data to compare regulatory responses to violations
in Nevada and New Jersey (see Rorie, 2017; Rorie and van Wingerde, 2017). Much legal
and policy literature conveys an image of restrictive regulation in Atlantic City, where
regulators focus primarily on protecting the public and seem to resist promoting the
industry. This is in contrast to the literature on Las Vegas regulators, who are portrayed
as “hands off” until particularly egregious issues require attention (i.e., taking an
“enforced self-regulation” approach similar to what is seen in the Enforcement Pyramid)
and are also known for allowing public participation and industry feedback in the rulemaking process (Aronovitz, 2002; Becker, 2007; Cabot et al., 2016; Hicks, 1980; Prum
and Bybee, 1999). I examined complaints and disposition files available from New
Jersey and Nevada regulatory agencies, and found some support for the notion that
Nevada takes a hybrid/escalated sanctions approach, whereas New Jersey takes a more
punitive/adversarial approach.
Specifically, New Jersey regulators filed formal complaints more often than
Nevada regulators—there were 149 complaints in New Jersey from February 2011 to
December 2016, compared to 66 complaints in Nevada from March 2009 to August
2016. The data indicated that Nevada regulators had many interactions with the licensees
prior to formally filing a complaint, but when they did file a formal complaint they
were willing to be quite punitive. Nevada regulators cited licensees for an average of
7.70 violations in each complaint filing (New Jersey averaged 1.09 violations cited per
complaint) and fined violators an average of $295,696.84 (compared to New Jersey’s
average of $17,260.92). Furthermore, Nevada regulators most often cited licensees for
violations related to “failure to notify or obtain commission approval” before doing
something (37.9% of cases involved this violation, compared to 4.7% of New Jersey
cases) and “noncompliance with internal compliance programs” (30.3% of cases)—these
violations speak to the importance of self-regulation in Nevada. New Jersey regulators
also cited licensees for “noncompliance with internal compliance programs (22.8% of
cases), but were more likely than Nevada regulators to sanction licensees for “allowing
prohibited individuals access to gambling or alcohol” (29.5% of cases, compared to
6.1% of cases in Nevada) and “violations of advertising regulations” (4.7% of cases,
0.0% in Nevada), implying that they focus heavily on harm prevention (see also Rorie,
2017; Rorie and van Wingerde, 2017).
Such data are notable, among other reasons, because of the success (or lack
thereof) of these two markets—Nevada has seen generally increasing gaming revenues
since 1984, while New Jersey’s market has been stagnant or declining (Cabot et al.,
2016; Eadington, 2011; Flanagan et al., 2014; Hicks, 1980; Morse and Goss, 2007;
Schwartz, 2017a; Schwartz, 2017b). Some scholars argue that “Nevada’s casino-friendly
rules appear to have been quite effective at developing a successful model for generating
economic benefits from the gaming industry” (Morse and Goss, 2007:114), while others
argue that the high level of constraints on Atlantic City casinos stifles innovation in
that jurisdiction and makes it unable to compete with emerging gaming industries on
the East Coast (Aronovitz, 2002; Cabot et al., 2016; Hicks, 1980). Unfortunately, little
data compares consumer harms in these jurisdictions, although one study indicates that
problem gambling prevalence among adults does not seem to differ widely between
Nevada and New Jersey (2.7% and 2.8%, respectively; Williams et al., 2012).
In essence, I believe that Responsive Regulation would allow regulators to
balance their conflicting roles, if adopted authentically—in other words, adoption of a
10 Personal Communication with Karin van Wingerde, Assistant Professor of Criminology at Erasmus Universiteit-Rotterdam, telephone correspondence (November 2, 2016).
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scheme incorporating a) initial cooperation but an escalation of punishments, b) third
party involvement, and c) an emphasis on what the industry/licensees are doing “right”
instead of a narrow focus on violations. The comparison of Nevada with New Jersey is
interesting, but (due to the use of only available government documents) I am unable
to say whether Nevada’s approach is truly “responsive” in nature and New Jersey’s is
truly adversarial. It seems likely that regulators use additional, non-public strategies to
discipline licensees, such as informal discussions, warning letters, inspection scores,
etc. To the extent that regulators use those strategies, I have not captured those in this
description.
Conclusion
Ultimately, this article notes that gambling regulators’ jobs are subject to
conflicting obligations—to both promote and prevent potentially-harmful behaviors.
To handle this inherent balancing act, gambling regulators should clearly articulate an
evidence-based, theoretically-founded, regulatory strategy that involves third parties and
uses an escalated sanctioning approach. Of most import, regulators must recognize that
responses to violations are governed by industry efforts as well as the needs, desires, and
fears of the population. Regulators would benefit from a “tripartite” effort; they should
engage the public and policymakers in a dialogue about how regulators should respond
to potentially-harmful industry behaviors. Such considerations include understanding
why the jurisdiction legalized gambling, whether regulators are expected to help
promote or constrain the industry, and how local residents feel about gambling and its
consequences/benefits (Rorie, 2017). As part of such an information-gathering effort,
regulators should engage licensees and citizens in a discussion of how to maximize the
benefits desired by the state while minimizing the potential burdens on the citizens. By
including citizens in the regulatory process, potential claims of “industry capture” are
minimized, trust between all parties can be built, and the regulators are better able to
communicate with industry participants about what the citizens in their communities
want from them (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1991; Rorie, 2015). By bringing industry and
the local community together to consult on regulatory policies, such policies are more
likely to be accepted by licensees as well as citizens.
Furthermore, regulators can use such meetings to educate licensees about
how best to achieve compliance with regulations as well as persuade them to adopt
proactive, socially responsible behaviors desired by the public—such behaviors would
further legitimize the industry. In contrast, when a licensee does violate regulations,
having public participation in the regulatory process can prevent potential concerns
about inconsistent treatment of similar violations and enhance the effectiveness of
sanctions. Companies, particularly large and visible ones, are often primarily motivated
by potential damage to their reputation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1991; Braithwaite, 1989;
Gunningham et al., 2004; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1994).
In sum, by committing to a transparent, responsive approach to regulatory
enforcement, gambling regulators can better:
•

Cope with the inherent “structural contradictions” of regulating a vice industry
while enhancing legitimacy among industry players, the public, and other government representatives

•

Demonstrate regulatory flexibility (i.e., responsiveness to context) while also being
fair in how they treat violators

•

Emphasize the strengths of the industry to motivate beyond-compliance behaviors

•

Reduce defiance from industry and enhance better industry-regulatory agency relationships
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•

Use information gained in cooperation with industry to better monitor industry

•

Use punitive sanctions when appropriate

•

Enhance transparency and reduce the likelihood of “bad” regulatory capture

•

Promote more compliance and deter future misconduct

•

Increase cross-jurisdictional consistency in regulatory content

Future Research Needs
Although Responsive Regulation has been empirically supported in myriad
industries, it has yet to be studied in the gambling industry. Only one jurisdiction (the
Netherlands) has explicitly and transparently adopted Responsive Regulation in practice, although it seems that Nevada informally/privately does so (Rorie and van Wingerde, 2017). Despite the elements of Responsive Regulation being present in regulatory
environments, it remains unclear whether such elements are achieving desired outcomes
(e.g., licensee compliance with regulations, employee and consumer protection, problem
gambling prevention). There are few data collection efforts in this industry testing the
effectiveness of any specific regulatory strategies or changes in regulatory strategies (but
see Bondolfi et al., 2008; Chambers and Willox, 2009; LaBrie and Shaffer, 2003). As
Planzer and Wardle (2012:414) state, there is a “gulf between the ‘regulatory’ discussion
in the scientific literature and the regulatory discussion among politicians, regulators,
and lawyers.” They describe this “gulf” as reflecting different priorities from the two
groups—academics generally want to determine the impact of gambling on the population, while policymakers/practitioners are eager to find out “what works” legislatively to
prevent harms while maximizing the economic and social benefits of gambling.
I agree with Planzer and Wardle that this “gulf” is not necessary and further
argue that each party working in isolation is doing little to protect the population.
Research scholars cannot effectively translate their research into prevention programs
without the help of policymakers, and policymakers cannot be effective without
measuring the potential and actual impact of regulatory programs using rigorous
research methodologies (see Gainsbury et al., 2014). Collaboration between regulators
and scholars requires that regulators be willing to collect and share data and hear about
the potential harms from gambling, while academics must focus more on providing
evidence useful to regulators, not just focusing on the harms from gambling. Only
through information sharing and collaboration can we determine the most proportional,
efficient, and fair approach to protecting consumers as well as state interests in
gambling.

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

87

References
Abbott, K.W., and Snidal, D. (2013). Taking responsive regulation transnational:
Strategies for international organizations. Regulation & Governance 7(1), 95 –
113.
Adams, P. J., Raeburn, J., & De Silva, K. (2009). A question of balance: prioritizing
public health responses to harm from gambling. Addiction, 104(5), 688-691.
American Gaming Association. (2013). State of the States: The AGA Survey of Casino
Entertainment. Retrieved from: https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/
files/research_files/aga_sos2013_rev042014.pdf
Antolak-Saper, N. (2010). The legal effect of voluntary self-exclusion programs for
problem gamblers. Deakin Law Review, 15, 169 – 204.
Aronovitz, C. (2002). The regulation of commercial gaming. Chapman Law Review 5,
181 – 208.
Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1991). Tripartism: Regulatory capture and
empowerment. Law & Social Inquiry, 16(3), 435-496.
Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate. Oxford University Press.
Baldwin, R., & Black, J. (2008). Really responsive regulation. The Modern Law
Review, 71(1), 59-94.
Banks, J. (2017). Gambling, Crime and Society. Palgrave MacMillan: London.
Barrett, S.R.H., Speth, R.L., Eastham, S.D., Dedoussi, I.C., Ashok, A., Malina, R., and
Keith, D.W. (2015). Impact of the Volkswagon emissions control defeat device
on US public health. Environmental Research Letters 10(11), 1 – 10.
Basham, P., and Luik, J. (2011). The social benefits of gambling. Economic Affairs 31(1),
9 – 13.
Bauer, J. E. (2006). Self-exclusion and the compulsive gambler: The house shouldn’t
always win. Northern Illinois University Law Review, 27, 63-94.
Becker, E.B. (2007). Slots in the city: A critical look at the balance of decision-making
power in gaming legislation. Fordham Urban Law Journal 25, (5), 1034 – 1073.
Belletire, M. (1999). Legislating and Regulating Casino Gambling: A view from state
regulators. Retrieved from: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/belletire.
pdf
Berger-Walliser, G., & Shrivastava, P. (2014). Beyond compliance: Sustainable
development, business, and proactive paw. Georgetown Journal of International
Law, 46, 417-474.
Berman, M., and Post, C. (2007). Secondhand Smoke and Casinos. Law Synopsis by the
Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. Retrieved from: http://www.asat.org.ar/
images/comunidad/publicaciones/tclc-syn-casinos-2007_0[1].pdf
Bertels, S., Cody, M., & Pek, S. (2014). A responsive approach to organizational
misconduct: Rehabilitation, reintegration, and the reduction of
reoffense. Business Ethics Quarterly, 24(03), 343-370.
Bisschop, L. (2014). How e-waste challenges environmental governance. International
Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 3(2), 81-85.
Black, J., and Baldwin, R. (2010). Really responsive risk-based regulation. Law & Policy
32(2), 181 – 213.
Bogart, W. A. (2010). Permit But Discourage: Regulating Excessive Consumption.
Oxford University Press.
Bondolfi, G., Jermann, F., Ferrero, F., Zullino, D., & Osiek, C. H. (2008). Prevalence
of pathological gambling in Switzerland after the opening of casinos
and the introduction of new preventive legislation. Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica, 117(3), 236-239.
Braithwaite, J. (2013). Relational republican regulation. Regulation & Governance, 7(1),
124-144.

88

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

Regulating a “Pariah” Industry

Braithwaite, J. (2011). The essence of responsive regulation. UBC Law Review, 44, 475520.
Braithwaite, J. (2006). Responsive regulation and developing economics. World
Development 34(5), 884 – 898.
Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation. Oxford University
Press.
Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, Shame, and Reintegration. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Braithwaite, J., & Hong, S. H. (2015). The iteration deficit in responsive regulation: Are
regulatory ambassadors an answer?. Regulation & Governance, 9(1), 16-29.
Braithwaite, J., Makkai, T., & Braithwaite, V. A. (2007). Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism
and the New Pyramid. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Buchanan, J., Elliott, G., & Johnson, L. W. (2009). The marketing of legal but potentially
harmful products and corporate social responsibility: the gaming industry view.
The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 4, 81.
Cabot, A. (1994). The economics of gaming regulation. UNLV Gaming Research &
Review Journal, 1(1), 3.
Cabot, A. N., Christiansen, E. M., & Zou, B. (2016). A Tale of Two Cities: Las Vegas and
Atlantic City. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 20(9), 718-742.
Cabot, A., and Preber, B. (2008). Gaming Compliance. Retrieved from: http://www.lrrc.
com/files/Uploads/Documents/CabotPreber_02_08.pdf
Canada Department of Justice. (2002). Government Response to the Fifteenth Report of
the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Retrieved from: http://
www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/jhr-jdp/bkgr-cont.html
Caulkins, J. P., Kilmer, B., Kleiman, M. A., MacCoun, R. J., Midgette, G., Oglesby, P.,
Pacula, R.L., & Reuter, P. H. (2015). Considering Marijuana Legalization:
Insights for Vermont and Other Jurisdictions. Rand Corporation.
Chambers, C., & Willox, C. (2009). Gambling on compliance with the new 2005 Act: Do
organisations fulfil new regulations? International Review of Law, Computers &
Technology, 23(3), 203-215.
Chambliss, W.J. (1993) On lawmaking. In W.J. Chambliss and M. Zatz (eds.), Making
Law: The State, The Law, and Structural Contradictions (pp. 3 – 35). Indiana
University Press.
Chang, S. (1996). Impact of casinos on crime: The case of Biloxi, Mississippi. Journal of
Criminal Justice, 24(5), 431-436.
Cohen, J.E., Ashley, M.J., Ferrence, R., Brewster, J. M., & Goldstein, A.O. (1999).
Institutional addiction to tobacco. Tobacco Control, 8(1), 70-74.
Cosgrave, J., & Klassen, T. R. (2001). Gambling against the state: The state and the
legitimation of gambling. Current Sociology, 49(5), 1-15.
Cronin, B., and Davenport, B. C. E. (2001). E-rogenous zones: Positioning pornography
in the digital economy. The Information Society, 17(1), 33-48.
Dadayan, L. (2016). State Revenues from Gambling, Short-Term Relief, Long-Term
Disappointment. Retrieved from: http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_
finance/2016-04-12-Blinken_Report_Three.pdf
Dannon, P. N., Lowengrub, K., Musin, E., Gonopolsky, Y., & Kotler, M. (2007).
12-month follow-up study of drug treatment in pathological gamblers: a primary
outcome study. Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 27(6), 620-624.
de Graaf, G., Kingma, S., School, J., & Zborowska, N. (2011). Tricky business: The
nature of integrity violations in Dutch casinos. Journal of Gambling Issues, 26,
89-109.
Delfabbro, P., & King, D. (2012). Gambling in Australia: Experiences, problems, research
and policy. Addiction, 107(9), 1556-1561.

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

89

Eadington, W.R. (2011). After the great recession: The future of casino gaming in
America and Europe. Economic Affairs (March), 27 – 33.
Etienne, J. (2013). Ambiguity and relational signals in regulator–regulatee
relationships. Regulation & Governance, 7(1), 30-47.
Etzioni, A. (2009). The capture theory of regulation—revisited. Society 46, 319 – 323.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. (2016). Enforcement Actions. Retrieved from:
https://www.fincen.gov/news-room/enforcement-actions
Flanagan, F. Racic, S. and Rudd, D.P. (2014). The impact of local economic conditions
on casinos revenues. Proceedings of ASBBS, 21(1): 254 – 261.
Ford, C. (2013). Prospects for scalability: Relationships and uncertainty in responsive
regulation. Regulation & Governance, 7(1), 14-29.
Friedman, N. H. (1994). An overview of disciplinary proceedings before the Nevada
Gaming Commission. UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal, 1(1), 61 74.
Gainsbury, S. M., Aro, D., Ball, D., Tobar, C., & Russell, A. (2015). Optimal content for
warning messages to enhance consumer decision making and reduce problem
gambling. Journal of Business Research, 68(10), 2093-2101.
Gainsbury, S. M., Blankers, M., Wilkinson, C., Schelleman-Offermans, K., & Cousijn,
J. (2014). Recommendations for international gambling harm-minimisation
guidelines: Comparison with effective public health policy. Journal of
Gambling Studies, 30(4), 771-788.
Gainsbury, S.M., Parke, J., & Suhonen, N. (2013). Consumer attitudes towards Internet
gambling: Perceptions of responsible gambling policies, consumer protection,
and regulation of online gambling sites. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(1),
235-245.
Gainsbury, S.M., & Wood, R. (2011). Internet gambling policy in critical comparative
perspective: The effectiveness of existing regulatory frameworks. International
Gambling Studies, 11(3), 309-323.
Gale, G. (1994). The Audit Division of the State Gaming Control Board: Overview
of Organization and Current Tax Issues. UNLV Gaming Research & Review
Journal, 1(1), 75 - 82.
Gerstein, D., Hoffman, J., Larison, C., Engelman, L., Murphy, S., Palmer, A., Chuchro,
L, et al. (1999). Gambling Impact and Behavior Study: Report to the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission. Retrieved from: http://www.norc.org/
pdfs/publications/gibsfinalreportapril1999.pdf
Gilmore, W. C. (2004). Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to
Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. Council of
Europe.
Godinho, J. (2013). The Prevention of Money Laundering in Macau Casinos. Gaming
Law Review and Economics, 17(4), 262-274.
Grabosky, P. (2013). Beyond Responsive Regulation: The expanding role of non‐state
actors in the regulatory process. Regulation & Governance, 7(1), 114-123.
Grabosky, P. N. (1997). Discussion paper: Inside the pyramid: Towards a conceptual
framework for the analysis of regulatory systems. International Journal of the
Sociology of Law, 25(3), 195-201.
Gunningham, N., Kagan, R.A., and Thornton, D. (2004). Social license and
environmental protection: Why businesses go beyond compliance. Law &
Social Inquiry 29(2), 307 – 341.
Haile, A. J. (2009). Sin taxes: When the state becomes the sinner. Temple Law
Review, 82, 1041 - 1070.
Haines, F. (2016). Taming Business? Understanding Effectiveness in the Control of
Corporate and White-collar Crime. In R. Matthews (ed.) What is to Be Done
About Crime and Punishment? (pp. 223-250). Palgrave Macmillan UK.

90

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

		
Regulating a “Pariah” Industry

Hancock, L. (2011). Regulatory Failure? The Case of Crown Casino. Deakin
University: Australian Scholarly Publishing.
Hancock, L., Schellinck, T., & Schrans, T. (2008). Gambling and corporate social
responsibility (CSR): Re-defining industry and state roles on duty of care
responsibility and risk management. Policy and Society 27(1), 55 – 68.
Heimer, C. A. (2011). Disarticulated responsiveness: The theory and practice of
responsive regulation in multi-layered systems. UBC Law Review, 44, 663 694.
Hess, D. (2008). The three pillars of corporate social reporting as new governance
regulation: Disclosure, dialogue, and development. Business Ethics Quarterly,
447-482.
Hicks, A. J. (1980). No Longer the Only Game in Town: A Comparision of the Nevada
and New Jersey Regulatory Systems of Gaming Control. Sw. UL Rev., 12, 583.
Homeyer, K. D. (2011). Lefty is Still Right: The Continued Importance of State
v. Rosenthal to Nevada Gaming Regulation. Gaming Law Review and
Economics, 15(3), 105-120.
Huang, P. H., & Wu, H. M. (1994). More order without more law: A theory of social
norms and organizational cultures. The Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 10, 390-406.
Humphreys, A. (2010). Semiotic structure and the legitimation of consumption
practices: The case of casino gambling. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(3),
490-510.
Irwin, N. (2015, Sept. 24). Daily fantasy sports and the hidden cost of America’s weird
gambling laws. The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/27/upshot/daily-fantasy-sports-and-the-hidden-cost-of-americasweird-gambling-laws.html?_r=0.
Ivec, M., & Braithwaite, V. (2015). Applications of Responsive Regulatory
Theory in Australia and Overseas: Update (2015). Retrieved from: http://
regnet.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2015-05/
Occasional%2520Paper%252023_Ivec_Braithwaite_0.pdf
Jacques, C., Ladouceur, R., & Ferland, F. (2000). Impact of availability on gambling: A
longitudinal study. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 45(9), 810-815.
Jongmans, B. (2015). The ‘Overhaul’ of Malta’s Gambling Framework
So Far. Retrieved from: http://www.gaminglegalgroup.com/
woglr?rurl=%252Fexitpage-g%252FGames.php
Kingma, S. F. (2008). The liberalization and (re) regulation of Dutch gambling markets:
National consequences of the changing European context. Regulation &
Governance, 2(4), 445-458.
Kolieb, J. (2015). When to punish, when to persuade and when to reward: Strengthening
responsive regulation with the regulatory diamond. Monash University Law
Review, 41(1).
LaBrie, R., & Shaffer, H. (2003). Toward a science of gambling regulation: a concept
statement. AGA Responsible Gaming Lecture Series, 2(2), 1-7.
Levi, M. (2002). Money laundering and its regulation. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 582(1), 181-194.
Lodge, M. (2004). Accountability and transparency in regulation: Critiques, doctrines,
and instruments. In Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds.) The Politics of
Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance
(pp. 124 – 144). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Loh, C. M., Deegan, C., & Inglis, R. (2015). The changing trends of corporate
social and environmental disclosure within the Australian gambling
industry. Accounting & Finance, 55(3), 783-823.
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

91

Lopez-Gonzalez, H., Estévez, A., & Griffiths, M. D. (2017). Marketing and
Advertising Online Sports Betting: A Problem Gambling Perspective.
Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 41 (3), 256-272.
Makkai, T. and Braithwaite, J. (1994). Reintegrative shaming and compoiance with
regulatory standards. Criminology 32(3), 361 – 385.
Mascini, P., & Wijk, E. V. (2009). Responsive regulation at the Dutch Food and
Consumer Product Safety Authority: an empirical assessment of assumptions
underlying the theory. Regulation & Governance, 3(1), 27-47.
Matthews, C. (2016, March 24). The 5 biggest vice industries in the world. Forbes.
Retrieved from: http://fortune.com/2016/03/24/vice-industries/.
McGinley, A. (2012). Trouble in Sin City: Protecting Sexy Workers’ Civil
Rights. Stanford Law & Policy Review, 23(1), 253.
Mendeloff, J. (1984). The role of OSHA violations in serious workplace accidents.
Journal of Occupational Medicine 26(5), 353 – 360.
Miers, D. (2016). Social Responsibility and Harm Minimization in Commercial
Gambling in Great Britain. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 20(2), 164176.
Miers, D. (2011). From constraint to competition: 50 years of change in British
gambling policy. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 15(3), 93-103.
Morse, E.A., and Goss, E.P. (2007). Governing Fortune. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Moufakkir, O. (2005). An assessment of crime volume following casino gaming
development in the City of Detroit. UNLV Gaming Research & Review
Journal, 9(1), 15.
Mun, P. (2002). Calculated Risk-Taking: The Governance of Casino Gambling in
Ontario. Dissertation, University of Toronto.
National Indian Gaming Commission. (2016a). Functions of a Tribal Gaming
Commission. Retrieved from: http://www.nigc.gov/compliance/detail/
functions-of-a-tribal-gaming-commission
National Indian Gaming Commission. (2016b). FAQS. Retrieved from: http://www.
nigc.gov/commission/faqs/detail/what-is-the-commissions-role-in-regulatingindian-gaming;
Netherlands Gaming Authority. (2016a). Strategy Summary 2016 – 2020. Retrieved
from: http://www.kansspelautoriteit.nl/algemene-onderdelen/secundairenavigatie/english/organization/publications/
Netherlands Gaming Authority. (2016b). Protecting and Informing Consumers.
Retrieved from: http://www.kansspelautoriteit.nl/algemene-onderdelen/
secundaire-navigatie/english/organization/public-objectives/protecting-and/
Nevada Gaming Control Board/Gaming Commission. (2016). About Us. Retrieved
from: http://gaming.nv.gov/index.aspx?page=2;
New Jersey Casino Control Commission. (2016). About The Commission. Retrieved
from: http://www.nj.gov/casinos/about/
Nichols, M. W., Stitt, B. G., & Giacopassi, D. (2004). Changes in suicide and divorce
in new casino jurisdictions. Journal of Gambling Studies, 20(4), 391-404.
Panasitti, M., & Schull, N. (1994). Re-Articulating the Moral Economy of Gambling.
Retrieved from: http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/anthpubs/ucb/text/
kas077-005.pdf;
Park, M., & Stokowski, P. A. (2011). Casino gaming and crime: Comparisons among
gaming counties and other tourism places. Journal of Travel Research, 50(3),
289-302.
Parker, C. (2013). Twenty years of responsive regulation: An appreciation and
appraisal. Regulation & Governance, 7(1), 2-13.

92

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

Regulating a “Pariah” Industry

Parker, C., & Lehmann Nielsen, V. (2011). The Fels effect: responsive regulation and
the impact of business opinions of the ACCC. Griffith Law Review, 20(1), 91120.
Pearce, J., Mason, K., Hiscock, R., & Day, P. (2008). A national study of neighbourhood
access to gambling opportunities and individual gambling behaviour. Journal
of Epidemiology and Community Health, 62(10), 862-868.
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (2013). Casino Violations Result in $105,000 in
Fines Levied by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board. Retrieved from:
http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=518
Pickering, D., Blaszczynski, A., Hartmann, M., and Keen, B. (2016). Fantasy sports:
Skills, gambling, or are these irrelevant issues? Current Addiction Reports 3,
307.
Planzer, S., & Wardle, H. (2012). What we know about the impact of advertising on
disordered gambling. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 3, 588-593.
Prum, D. A., & Bybee, S. (1999). Commercial casino gaming in the United States:
A jurisdictional analysis of gaming taxes, licenses, and fees. UNLV Gaming
Research & Review Journal, 4(1), 2- 42.
Rawlings, G. (2007). Taxes and Transnational Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the
Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty. Law & Policy, 29(1), 51-66.
Rebovich, D. J., Layne, J., Jiandani, J., & Hage, S. (2000). The National Public Survey
on White Collar Crime. Morgantown, WV: National White Collar Crime
Center.
Reiss, D. R. (2012). The benefits of capture. Wake Forest Law Review, 47(2), 569 – 610.
Rockloff, M., Russell, A., Browne, M., and Hing, N. (2017, April). The Utility of
Gambling for Entertainment. Presentation prepared for the Alberta Gambling
Research Institute’s 2017 Annual Conference (Bannf, Canada). Retrieved from:
http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/51915/21/AGRI2017%2014%20
Rockloff%20-%20Utility%20-%20for%20posting.pdf
Rodriguez, L. J., & Barlow, D. E. (1999). Structural contradictions and the United
States sentencing commission. Crime, law and social change , 32(2), 169-202.
Rorie, M., Simpson, S., Cohen, M., and Vandenbergh, M. (in press). “Examining
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Corporate Offending and
Overcompliance.” Law & Policy.
Rorie, M. and van Wingerde, C. (2017, June) “Regulating Markets of Vice: Gaming
Regulations Across Time and Place.” Paper presented at the 2017 Law and
Society Association’s Annual Meeting, Mexico City, Mexico.
Rorie, M. (2017) Regulating the Gaming Industry Across Time and Place. Center for
Crime and Justice Policy, Research in Brief. Las Vegas, NV: University of
Nevada, Las Vegas.
Rorie, M. (2015). Responsive Regulation. Invited essay to the Oxford Handbooks
Online in Criminology and Criminal Justice. Available at http://www.
oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199935383-e-109
Sasso, W. V., & Kalajdzic, J. (2006). Do Ontario and Its Gaming Venues Owe a Duty of
Care to Problem Gamblers?. Gaming Law Review, 10(6), 552-570.
Sauer, R. D. (2001). The political economy of gambling regulation. Managerial and
Decision Economics, 22(1‐3), 5-15.
Sayre, R. E. (1994). The Investigations Division of the State Gaming Control Board: An
Introduction to the Investigative Process. UNLV Gaming Research & Review
Journal, 1(1), 95 - 100.
Schwartz, D.G. (2016). United States Commercial Casino Revenues. Retrieved from:
http://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/national_annual_revenues.pdf

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

93

Schwartz, D.G. (2017a). Nevada Gaming Revenues 1984-2016: Calendar Year Results
for Selected Reporting Areas. Las Vegas: Center for Gaming Research,
University Libraries, University of Nevada Las Vegas. Retrieved from: http://
gaming.unlv.edu/reports/NV_1984_present.pdf
Schwartz, D.G. (2017b). Atlantic City Gambling Revenue. Las Vegas: Center for
Gaming Research, University Libraries, University of Nevada Las Vegas.
Retrieved from: http://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/ac_hist.pdf
Scott, L. & Barr, G. (2013). Unregulated gambling in South African townships: A policy
conundrum? Journal of Gambling Studies 29, 719 – 732.
Scott, R.A. (2017). Updating your fantasy lineups and the federal law: The case for
federal regulation of daily fantasy sports. Seton Hall Law Review, 47, 603 –
651.
Securities and Exchange Commission. (n.d.). Gaming Regulatory Overview. Retrieved
from: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/858339/000119312512115625/
d268435dex993.htm
Séguin, M., Boyer, R., Lesage, A., McGirr, A., Suissa, A., Tousignant, M., &
Turecki, G. (2010). Suicide and gambling: Psychopathology and treatmentseeking. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 24(3), 541-547.
Sherman, L. W. (1993). Defiance, deterrence, and irrelevance: A theory of the criminal
sanction. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30(4), 445-473.
Skolnick, J. H. (1978). House of Cards: The Legalization and Control of Casino
Gambling. Little, Brown.
Skolnick, J. H. (1979). The dilemmas of regulating casino gambling. Journal of Social
Issues, 35(3), 129-143.
Skolnick, J. H., & Dombrink, J. (1978). The legalization of
deviance. Criminology, 16(2), 193-208.
Slavina, I. (2010). Don’t bet on it: Casino’s contractual duty to stop compulsive
gamblers from gambling. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 85, 369-1199.
Smith, D. K. (2011). A harder nut to crack-Responsive regulation in the financial
services sector. UBC Law Review, 44, 695-742.
Spapens, T. (2012). The question of regulating illegal markets: The gambling and
cannabis markets in the Netherlands. GSTF Journal of Law and Social Sciences
(JLSS), 2(1), 30-37.
Spapens, T., Müller, T., & Van de Bunt, H. (2015). The Dutch drug policy from
a regulatory perspective. European Journal on Criminal Policy and
Research, 21(1), 191-205.
Stockwell, T., Single, E., Hawks, D., & Rehm, J. (1997). Opinion piece: Sharpening
the focus of alcohol policy from aggregate consumption to harm and risk
reduction. Addiction Research, 5(1), 1-9.
Thaw, D. (2014). Enlightened regulatory capture. Washington Law Review, 89(2), 329.
Titus, R. M., & Gover, A. R. (2001). Personal fraud: The victims and the scams. Crime
Prevention Studies, 12, 133-152.
To, W.M., Lai, T.M., and Chung, W.L. (2011). Fuel life cycle emissions for electricity
consumption in the world’s gaming center—Macao SAR, China. Energy 36(8),
5162 – 5168.
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why People Obey the Law. Princeton University Press.
Tyler, T. R., & Darley, J. M. (1999). Building a law-abiding society: Taking public
views about morality and the legitimacy of legal authorities into account when
formulating substantive law. Hofstra Law Review, 28, 707-740.

94

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

Regulating a “Pariah” Industry

United States Department of Justice. (2015). Former Peanut Company President
Receives Largest Criminal Sentence in Food Safety Case; Two Others Also
Sentenced for Their Roles in Salmonella-Tainted Peanut Product Outbreak.
Retrieved from: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-peanut-companypresident-receives-largest-criminal-sentence-food-safety-case-two
Van Wyck, J., & Mason, K. A. (2001). Investigating vulnerability and reporting behavior
for consumer fraud victimization: Opportunity as a social aspect of age. Journal
of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 17(4), 328-345.
Volberg, R. A. (1994). The prevalence and demographics of pathological gamblers:
implications for public health. American Journal of Public Health, 84(2), 237241.
Wakefield, M.A., Chaloupka, F.J., Kaufman, N.J., Orleans, C.T., Barker, D.C., and Ruel,
E.E. (2000). Effect of restrictions on smoking at home, at school, and in public
places on teenage smoking: Cross-sectional study. BMJ 321(7257), 333 – 337.
Walker, D. M., and Calcagno, P. T. (2013). Casinos and political corruption in the United
States: a Granger causality analysis. Applied Economics, 45(34), 4781-4795.
Walker, D.M., and Jackson, J.D. (2011). The effect of legalized gambling on state
revenue. Contemporary Economic Policy 29(1), 101 – 114.
Weinstein, A., Klein, L. D., & Dannon, P. N. (2015). A comparison of the status,
legal, economic, and psychological characteristics of types of adult male
gamblers. Journal of Gambling Studies, 31(3), 987-994.
Westerman, P. (2013). Pyramids and the value of generality. Regulation &
Governance, 7(1), 80-94.
Wexler, M. N. (2011). Which fox in what henhouse and when? Conjectures on regulatory
capture. Business and Society Review, 116(3), 277-302.
Williams, R.J., Rehm, J., and Stevens, R.M.G. (2011). The Social and Economic
Impacts of Gambling. Report prepared for the Canadian Consortium for
Gambling Research. Retrieved from: https://www.uleth.ca/dspace/bitstream/
handle/10133/1286/SEIG_FINAL_REPORT_2011.pdf?sequence
Williams, R.J., Volberg, R.A., and Stevens, R.M.G. (2012). The Population Prevalence
of Problem Gambling: Methodological Influences, Standardized Rates,
Jurisdictional Differences, and Worldwide Trends. Report prepared for the
Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre and the Ontario Ministry of Health
and Long Term Care. Retrieved from: https://www.uleth.ca/dspace/bitstream/
handle/10133/3068/2012-PREVALENCE-OPGRC%20(2).pdf
Wright, J. S., & Head, B. (2009). Reconsidering regulation and governance theory: A
learning approach. Law & Policy, 31(2), 192-216.

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal t Volume 21 Issue 1

95

